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A Dialogic Approach to Understanding Regime Conflicts: the case of the 
Development Agenda 
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Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy 
Department of European & International Studies 
 
Abstract: Despite the fact that early work on international regimes conceptualised them as 
dialogic in nature, this fundamental regime property has remained relatively underdeveloped.  
Drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle, this article proposes a dialogic 
framework to understanding regimes and the political struggles that constitute them. Focusing 
on the contextual and relational properties of signification processes within a regime, one of the 
key arguments is that neither their dialogic nature, nor the trajectory and outcome of a 
particular conflict can be understood without giving full attention to language as a power-laden 
form of action.  By focusing on how language and discourse are implicated and put to work in a 
particular instance of regime contestation, namely the Development Agenda proposed by a 
group of developing countries’ representatives at the World Intellectual Property Organization 
in 2004, efforts are made not only to bring to the fore the political and ideological nature of the 
‘shared understandings’ without which a regime would not exist, but also the manner in which 
they are reproduced and reinvigorated, even by acts that set out to challenge them.   
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A Dialogic Approach to Understanding Regime Conflicts: the case of the 
Development Agenda 
 
 
Despite seemingly irreconcilable positions, the debate between various nuances of 
neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and constructivism over the nature of 
international regimes during the 1970s and 1980s produced a consensual definition 
which conceptualizes them as a set of principles, norms, rules and procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in an issue-area.1 It proved not to be an academic 
fad: since the ‘issue-area’ concept was proposed as a more fruitful unit of analysis in 
international relations, work on international regimes has displayed a considerable 
degree of intellectual continuity Indeed, the rise of the global governance concept as 
one of the central themes of the study of global affairs in the post-Cold War period 
testifies not to the collapse of the regime concept, but rather to its continued relevance, 
for the substantive questions that underpinned the regime research agenda continue to 
be central to global governance studies. Besides, the regime research agenda itself has 
evolved in new directions, one of the most recent being that of explaining the 
interactions and overlaps between various regimes, or the emergence of the so-called 
regime complexes.  
 
It is not complacency that recognizing the contributions of the regime research agenda 
is meant to induce, but rather a renewed criticism over the manner in which it has been 
carried out. Renewed is the apposite term, for much of the early criticism, raised 
especially by constructivists, is yet to be fully addressed. It is true that criticism over 
the mismatch between the intersubjective nature of regimes and the positivist 
epistemology used to study them did open space for more interpretative/cognitive 
approaches that gave weight to the role of ideas, knowledge and discourse in 
explaining the nature of international regimes. Indeed, only few scholars would reject 
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the role of ideas and knowledge in shaping regime interactions today, but ideas and 
knowledge are often conceptualized as neutral and autonomous variables that affect 
rational and strategic action. For their part, constructivists insisted on the importance 
of social knowledge – of norms and understandings of self and others – in the 
communicative dynamics of regimes and their inherently intersubjective character. 
Nonetheless, insofar as a conceptualization of regimes as shared understandings that 
fix the meaning of behaviour for a community of actors following the logic of 
appropriateness was stressed, the conflictual and ideological nature of acts that 
contribute to fixing meaning and what comes to be seen as appropriate was somewhat 
obfuscated.   
 
In contrast, a critical and political regime concept conceptualizes regimes not as 
structures but as processes, as political struggles between unequal regime actors over 
defining, fixing, normalizing and naturalising particular meanings, principles and 
norms about how a particular issue-area is governed. Precisely because regimes are 
intersubjective and inherently dialogic,2 these political struggles are mediated through 
language. It is through language that a particular meaning is fixed and naturalised 
within a regime, it is through language that a group of actors becomes dominant, and 
through language again that others raise to challenge it: barring rare cases of physical 
violence, the struggles and conflicts that are constitutive of current regimes are 
crystallised in and through language. Based on some conceptual insights from the 
work of the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle, this article proposes a 
dialogic approach as a tool for exploring the way in which language is put to use in 
political struggles between actors in their efforts to fix or subvert ‘ways of governing’ 
in a regime, that is, for exploring language as a power-laden form of action – as praxis. 
Although it has had a profound impact on literary and some cultural studies, Bakhtin’s 
work has yet to be fully recognised in political analysis.3 Anticipating the ‘linguistic 
turn’, all this work is thoroughly animated by a dialogic concept of meaning that 
makes Bakhtin more a social theorist of ideology than a philologist. I turn to it because 
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of its conceptualisation of language as praxis that ties in actors, relations, context and 
ideology together.  
 
Turning to Bakhtin’s work is justified not on account of the absence of approaches that 
focus on language and the communicative sphere, but in their tendency to attenuate 
the proper nature of language as a power-laden form of action and a material 
mediation embedding, contesting and enacting social relations of power. A recent 
categorisation of argumentation approaches along empirical-normative and 
ontologically universalist-contextualist lines makes such general tendency clear even in 
the more substantial of these approaches,4 e.g. those built on Habermas’ 
communicative action theory and argumentative deontology based on Searlean 
insights.5  This remains largely the case in Antje Wiener’s important A Theory of 
Contestation (2014); ‘contestedness’ here is the meta-organising principle of global 
governance, in the sense that its norms and rules require access to regular contestation 
in order to work, to generate legitimacy and, importantly, to avoid conflict. In the 
Bakhtinian dialogic approach, contestability is ontological, the communicative sphere 
is invariably the site of political and ideological struggles amongst unequal actors, and 
the naturalisation/legitimisation of norms is often the outcome of a process that has 
(temporarily) succeeded in effacing a norm’s arbitrary and coercive nature. Although 
the concern is sometimes voiced that Bakhtin’s dialogism has little to say on the role of 
power,6 this is largely the result of the lack of an explicit conceptualisation of the 
political in Bakhtin’s work. This is not to say, however, that power relations do not 
feature. The proposed dialogic framework here is justified precisely on account of the 
centrality of power relations in it, not only in its conceptualisation of language and 
ideology as material practices of enormous social force, but also in its attention to the 
concrete relational and historical properties of the context where struggles over 
meaning and signification take place.      
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The dialogic approach developed here is particularly concerned with showing how 
oppositional discourses often invigorate the dominant discourse.7 As such, it only 
provides a limited application of Bakhtin’s dialogism, focusing specifically on his 
insights on how (in this case) challengers  often borrow, appropriate and use the same 
structure of signification in their communicative acts as dominant actors, both as a 
matter of routine and, importantly, during regime contests. Neither the outright 
replacement of the dominant ‘way of governing’ an issue, nor the sublation and 
synthesis of opposing ideas is what appears to occur during most regime conflicts; 
rather, a process of dis/re-articulation of various elements of the dominant discourse is 
more frequent. This process has important implications not only for the fate of a 
struggle unfolding at a particular moment, but also for the regime itself. Reinforcing 
and perpetuating the very order it set out to unsettle is not an infrequent outcome of a 
political challenge in a regime. This is so because, as we shall see, by virtue of 
appropriating doxic elements of the dominant discourse, the alternative discourse can 
become captive to and in effect reproduce the ‘veracity’ of that which has been 
appropriated. A dialogic approach helps us understand not only why most regime 
challenges fail to occasion radical breaks with current practices, but also why they may 
help legitimise and strengthen the dominant way of governing an issue within it.  
 
An approach strongly committed to the historical and socio-political particularity of 
dialogue8 almost demands a concrete examination of such particularity, which is why 
the second part of the article turns to the case of the WIPO Development Agenda. This 
Agenda was proposed by a group of developing countries at the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) in September 2004. More will be said about it in due 
course; suffice to say at this point that, unlike other contests within the intellectual 
property (IP) regime until then, the Agenda presented a seemingly comprehensive 
challenge to the norms underpinning not only WIPO’s work, but the entire IP regime. 
At the core of this political conflict lay the demand that both WIPO and the IP regime 
itself abandon the hitherto excessive focus on private intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
and address the more important but rather neglected task of promoting knowledge 
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production for developmental purposes. Many developing countries’ representatives 
who became known as the Group of Friends of Development, as well as a large 
number of civil society actors, rallied behind the Agenda, but, notwithstanding the 
considerable amount of energy expended on it, the debates between the proponents 
and opponents only produced a list of 45 recommendations in 2007 that were a 
watered-down version of the initial demands. No substantive changes to WIPO or the 
IP regime were ushered on its wake.   
 
Using a dialogic approach for contests unfolding in a regime seen as primarily 
‘technical’, attention is paid to the thoroughly political way in which discourses 
underpinning a regime challenge such as the Development Agenda can reinforce the 
dominant discourse. One of the main arguments is that the Agenda fell short of its 
original ambition because, as discussed in the second part, it was organised upon the 
same ‘truths’/‘shared understandings’ on IP and development that underpin the 
dominant discourse of the IP regime.  This analysis relies partly on submissions made 
to WIPO between 2004 and 2006, and on minutes of various meetings and General 
Assembly sessions until 2007. This material is considerable, even if the emerging 
themes are not.9 Those expecting a textual analysis will be disappointed, for one of the 
strengths of a dialogic approach to regime conflicts rests in it avoiding textualism – ‘a 
descent into the text’ á la Derrida – for a contextual and referential conception of 
meaning and discourse that is firmly grounded in the specific (regime) context in 
which the interaction takes place. Not the word, not even the sentence, but the utterance 
– a speech act, e.g. an assertion, a statement – is the fundamental unit (of 
communication) whose meaning is determined entirely in the context where actors are 
engaging each other. It is because regime conflicts, like all dialogic interactions, take 
place within and refract a specific relational context, that this part is organised in a 
manner which highlights the historical, political and contingent nature of three key 
‘shared understandings’/utterances that underpin both the dominant regime discourse 
and, importantly, that of the challengers, namely: ‘development’, ‘IP as necessary for 
development’ and ‘IP as incentive’. It shows how the presence of these dominant 
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‘truths’ in the discourse of the Agenda helped bring its proponent in overlapping zones 
of agreement with their opponents and, ultimately, led to the absorption of the most 
radical part of their challenge by 2007. 
 
 
 
1. A dialogic approach to regime conflicts 
 
 
If a regime is said to exist, it exists only insofar as actors share certain understandings, 
meanings and expectations about governing a specific issue-area. In other words, 
actors agree to a lesser or greater extent that a particular issue-area exists, that it needs 
to be governed/regulated, in a certain manner and towards certain ends. But how are 
such understandings and meanings achieved/fixed? The answer in mainstream regime 
studies – coercion and/or rationality – sidelines rather than addresses it. To do so, a 
more robust understanding is required of the role language plays in producing, fixing 
or unsettling meanings and understandings within a regime. This is so because 
regimes are socio-political phenomena that are perceived through (written/spoken) 
language.  
 
For Bakhtin, all social phenomena are constituted through the ongoing dialogic 
relationship between individuals and groups – nothing means anything unless it is 
communicated and acknowledged. Meaning does not reside in individual cognition, 
but is produced through a dialogic process between addresser and addressee. As 
Vološinov argued, “any true understanding is dialogic in nature”.10 Language and 
meaning are profoundly social and dialogic, but it would be mistaken to relegate the 
status of dialogue as merely a conversation or another type of experience; for Bakhtin, 
dialogue is the archetype of all possible experiences.11  Dialogism, the centrepiece 
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Bakhtinian concept, refers to the joint labour of meaning production in the dialogic 
interaction between concrete utterances and interlocutors that unfolds in a particular 
historical situation.12 What gives dialogue its central position is not its text, but above 
all the fact that it manifests the relation between actors engaged in it, as well as the 
context in which it takes place. In the dialogic interaction, every utterance is produced 
by a concrete addresser and is oriented towards a real/presumed addressee, each 
occupying a ‘location’ in a socio-political context that is hierarchically organized in 
terms of asymmetrical power-resources.13 Power relations feature strongly here, for the 
meaning of utterances resides neither in sentences nor in the psyche of the 
interlocutors. Meaning production, like all social practices, is neither a free-floating, 
nor an immaterial process;14 rather, it is determined entirely in the concrete context 
where interlocutors endowed with unequal power-resources struggle to fix meaning to 
serve their specific intentions.15 Dialogic interactions are refractions of concrete social 
relations where meaning is achieved through struggle and conflict. Dialogism as an 
approach makes a radical commitment to the relational, historical, material and 
ideological properties of such struggles over meaning and signification.16 
 
Such commitment is visible in one of the most distinctive features of dialogism: its 
focus on the communicative act in its totality as a social, generative and ideological 
process that expresses actors in relation to each other. The relational and conflictual 
nature of signification processes is part and parcel of the Bakhtinian conceptualisation 
of the communicative sphere as the terrain of continuous battles between 
groups/actors seeking to invest utterances with their own intentions in specific 
contexts. More specifically, the communicative sphere is the terrain of continuous 
tensions between centrifugal forces (of fixity and synthesis) on the one hand, and 
centripetal forces (of change, multivocality and dispersion) on the other.17 This process 
gives meaning its inherently multivocal nature; indeed, dialogism is not a dualism, but 
a necessary multiplicity in human perception.18 This does not simply mean that 
meaning is usually unstable and multi-accentual, but also that signification is a 
conflictual and ideological process in which actors engage in order to shift and fix the 
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flow of meaning in very particular, if arbitrary, ways. Indeed, despite its focus on 
multivoicedness, dialogism offers an understanding on how order and stability are 
brought to bear in the flow of meaning through what are referred to as ‘speech genres’, 
or discourses.19 Because meaning production takes place in a material context that is 
neither levelled nor neutral, attempts by a group to fix meaning and neutralise the 
semantic flux in specific genres/discourses are political and ideological acts.20 
Discursive practices are ideological when a group seeks and manages to objectify 
meaning by legitimising its preferred system of meaning as the only possible and 
rational one. When successful, this process of objectification leads to what Bakhtin 
referred to as monologism, a condition wherein the matrix of values and practices are 
subordinated to a single, unified perspective.21 
 
Returning to our earlier question about the shared understandings constitutive of 
regimes, the starting dialogic proposition is that all meaning is achieved through 
struggle. Thus, regimes are neither the fixed arrangements held together by bonds of 
coercion or ties of temporarily converging interests (per neorealism), nor the benign, 
orderly and cooperative arrangements among rational state actors (per neoliberal 
institutionalism). Rather, regimes are dynamic and contested processes characterised by 
struggles over defining, ordering, normalising and stabilising particular discourses, 
principles and norms related to governing an issue-area that are produced and 
maintained by certain actors to the marginalization of others.22 What issues are brought 
into the regime remit, what their relationship is understood to be (e.g. between IP and 
development), how they ought to be governed, by whom and towards what ends, are 
matters of disagreement and contestations. These struggles involve state and non-state 
actors who have asymmetrical power-resources (political, economic, cultural and 
symbolic) at their disposal at a given point in time. Incidentally, regime actors are not 
states; states do not talk or act, people do.23 In other words, regime actors proper are all 
the individuals (representing state and non-state entities) who engage in regime 
contests and shape, to a lesser or greater degree, their outcomes. Such outcomes cannot 
be foreseen a priori; nonetheless, they certainly are not merely discursive. For the 
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Bakhtin circle, language is praxis not only because it is articulated by concrete actors in 
a given socio-political context, but also because it elicits real effects in such contexts. 
The way IPRs are governed, for instance, has very real material consequences on the 
way groups of people can access and use knowledge and the considerable benefits, 
economic or otherwise, that stem from it.   
 
Regimes are not only the processes of struggle over producing ‘objective’ ways of 
governing an issue that are more congruent with the system of meaning and interests 
of a particular group, but they also embody the outcomes of previous contested 
processes. Depending on the history of a regime, some of these outcomes may be 
deeply entrenched and widely accepted, while others may be more susceptible to 
challenges. The ‘shared understandings’ that fix the meaning of principles and norms 
in a regime and enable actors to follow the logic of appropriateness embody the 
outcome of earlier political struggles; if they appear natural and universal, it is because 
a particular group has succeeded not only in objectifying its worldview, but also in 
effacing the coercion and (symbolic) violence embodied in such outcome. In the case of 
the IP regime, the granting of IP as rights rather than as privileges and as prerequisites 
for innovation and creativity provide examples of key regime norms shared widely 
presently, but deeply contested in the past. There may be cases in the life of a regime 
when a group of actors succeeds not only in legitimising and naturalising certain 
principles and norms, but its wider matrix of values and practices, that is to say, when 
a regime appears to be monologic and tension/conflict is latent. But because language 
and meaning – indeed, life itself – is a dialogic and contested process,24 extreme 
monologism is impossible.  Not only the less entrenched meanings, but also those that 
appear as universal ‘truths’ can be recalled and contested; as Bakhtin argued, “ at any 
moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of 
forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue's subsequent 
development along the way they are recalled and invigorated in renewed 
form…Nothing is absolutely dead”.25  
 
  
11 
 
Such optimism reveals Bakhtin’s normative disregard for monologism – which he 
regarded as violence26  – and is based on the real possibility of undermining it. Change 
is possible precisely because of the dialogic nature of meaning and signification. 
Language (as praxis) is not only the site where dominant power relations are 
embedded and reproduced, but also where they can be challenged, subverted and 
altered. The potential for change is inherent in the dialogic nature of language and 
meaning production, but such nature offers no guarantees that a radical overhaul of 
the dominant way of governing within a regime will occur.  Much depends on the way 
in which language is put to use in regime challenges, the understanding of which 
warrants a return to the Bahktinian conceptualisation of the communication sphere as 
characterised by tension and struggle over meaning. While contests within a regime 
can take different forms, they inevitably involve the (often collective) mobilisation of 
certain regime members who draw upon the thematic fields available to them to 
construct diagnoses for their ‘grievances’ and prognosis for change. It has already been 
noted that meaning – meaning given to the nature of the problem, its origins and 
possible solutions on the part of both challenging and dominant actors – is entirely 
determined in the context in which these actors are located at that specific point in 
time. The Bakhtinian term for the relational and contextual properties of meaning is 
addressivity: whatever else an utterance expresses – a claim or assertion about the 
nature of a problem, for instance – it expresses first and foremost the general condition 
of each speaker’s addresivity, that is, the particular place each occupies in a regime at 
that point in time which, in turn, is the source of whatever response is called from and 
supplied by them.  
 
To understand addresivity, it bears repeating that utterances are not merely an 
instance of talk or of communication. Rather, each utterance is the taking of a position 
by a speaker within a thematic field in which alternative positions are possible. 
Utterances are social processes that both express and are responsive to the relation 
between speakers and the context in which they unfold. What regime actors say and 
how they act when engaged in a concrete struggle depends not only on their definition 
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and understanding of what the situation is, but also – indeed, primarily – on their 
understanding of their place in the regime, i.e. the ‘address’ they occupy in the regime. 
Bourdieu was right to impress later the importance of the power to name things and to 
classify, because naming and classifying shapes the place from which actors speak and 
respond.27 Such addressivity is not created anew every time a regime actor speaks, but 
has been shaped by the ongoing process of meaning-production in the regime that has 
helped over time to order it by defining the categories, classifications, identities and 
relationships within it which, through repeated use in continuous utterances, become 
objectified as the natural order of the regime. In the case of the Development Agenda, 
challenging actors engage in regime contests from a particular position – as 
representatives of the ‘developing world’ – a category which is itself the result of 
ongoing discursive and material practices and struggles. This position, as we will see, 
shapes how these representatives act and what they say, with important material 
implications for the trajectory of the political challenge in question.  
 
Not only are utterances not originary – preceded, as they are, by all of the regime’s 
existence and other past and present utterances to which they respond – but they are 
not original either. The material available for their creation is already provided, for the 
regime in which they unfold at a particular moment is already saturated with meaning 
and burdened by “the accumulated weight of history and convention”.28  Bakhtin was 
keen to point out that language was overpopulated with the intentions of others: “The 
word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the 
speaker populates it with his own intention”,29 that is, when the speaker appropriates 
and adapts it to his/her own intentions. Acknowledging the encroachment of other 
actors’ discourses and intentions that occurs in the process of appropriating and 
vesting ‘the sign’ with one’s intentions, Bakhtin also acknowledged that 
“Expropriating it [language], forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, 
is a difficult and complicated process”.30 The difficulties actors encounter in the 
struggle over meaning production in their efforts to invest utterances with their own 
intentions in specific contexts – struggles over ‘the sign’ in Bakhtinian terms – are 
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crucial to understanding the widespread difficulty of constructing truly oppositional 
symbols that help bring about radical breaks with current regime practices.  
 
This is so because utterances are at once generative, relational and ideological processes. 
Ideology is used in a loose sense here, referring to practices through which meaning 
and values are produced; indeed, for the Bakhtin circle, any “utterance is an ideological 
construct in the small”,31 attempting to create and fix a particular meaning. Language is 
not ideological in this view; rather, it is ideology that is expressed in language through 
its use by competing groups.32 Language always comes into play in the struggles 
between various groups and crystallises these conflicts; being centrally implicated in 
the process of signification and constitutive of the symbolic dimension of social 
relations, ideology, like language, has real effects in society and human activity. As 
already noted, regimes are essentially contested and ideological processes that have 
profound material consequences in the issue-area they govern. They are ideological 
because the very existence of shared principles and norms attests to the success of a 
group in fixing their preferred meaning as natural and universal. This said, for the 
Bakhtin group there exists no strict correspondence between the dominant ideology 
and the dominant group; likewise, ideology is not understood as an epiphenomenon or 
a distorted representation of ‘the real’. Rather, language and ideology are an integral 
part of social differences and of struggles embedded in concrete contexts. Studying 
ideology does not merely entail examining how “structures of signification are 
mobilised to legitimate the interests of hegemonic groups”,33 because for the Bakhtin 
circle ideology has rather more to do with the expression of different worldviews 
through the same structure of signification.34 This is, once again, the struggle over ‘the 
sign’ which characterises dialogue, the struggle of differently situated regime actors to 
advance their position through using the same language and symbols and attempting 
to invest them with their own meanings. In other words, a political and ideological 
struggle of the regime kind is not one between opposing groups in possession of 
clearly defined ideologies played according to a guaranteed logic – Bakhtin’s dialogism 
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is not Hegelian dialectics35 – but rather the continuous disarticulation, re-articulation 
and intersection of different ‘accents’/meanings in the same discursive terrain.  
 
Bakhtin’s work routinely distinguished established from behavioural ideologies, the 
former being formalised and referring to that which is accepted as ‘the correct way’ to 
proceed, and the latter being more mobile and referring to the everyday practices of a 
group that include practices out of which heretical discourses may emerge. They do 
not lead a separate existence; on the contrary, established ideologies draw upon and 
are in organic contact with behavioural ideologies. If it is to remain dominant, the 
established ideology has to be highly flexible and capable of borrowing from, adapting 
and being incorporated into the worldview of agents outside the dominant group. In 
other words, the established ideology becomes part of what Bourdieu later called the 
discourses of the dominated,36 shaping both ordinary utterances and, importantly, the 
language of organised regime challenges.  
 
Indeed, it is the case that challenging actors often do not pit against the established 
ideology a completely radical/heretical one, but rather appropriate elements from it 
and inflect them with their own subversive meanings. This type of political action is 
very common, as challengers often tend to innovate at the margins of existing 
established ideologies.37 We have seen this is so because the struggle over meaning 
take place in the same discursive terrain and over the same structure of signification; 
for the same reason, there are limits to what can be said and done by actors engaged in 
acts of resistance. Despite the ‘premium’ dialogism places on multivoicedness and 
human creativity/agency, the possibilities to (re)signify are not endless. Instead, they 
are often limited at the level of the doxa, that is, at the level of categories, classifications 
and relations that are entrenched in the ‘common sense’ that permeate both the 
established and behavioural ideologies. These elements of the doxa usually go 
unquestioned and unchallenged in most acts, including acts of resistance.38 Not only 
do they go unchallenged, but, in an effort to subvert the established way of governing 
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an issue within a regime, challengers produce alternative discourses organised 
according to the very principles of doxic classifications and categories that are at the 
heart of the established order they are challenging.39 Attempts to create oppositional 
discourses are thus thwarted by the stubborn presence of doxic ‘truths’ appropriated, 
consciously or not, from the dominant ideology.  
 
In the case of the Development Agenda, one of the difficulties in constructing a truly 
heretical discourse rests in the ‘location’ from which its proponents formulate their 
demands. Their addressivity as representatives of developing countries is not of their 
making, but rather a doxic category originally produced by the West and subsequently 
naturalised and universalised – a category that not only remains completely 
unchallenged, but is further reinforced in the Agenda demands. In turn, this ’address’ 
shapes the utterances of the group in the historical process of producing, fixing or 
subverting meaning about the relationship between IP and development, of which the 
Development Agenda represents only a moment. This dialogic process is not one 
amongst equals. Actors involved in it routinely borrow from each other and from the 
context they inhabit, one already saturated with pre-existing meaning about IP and 
development and other categories. What they borrow from past and existing meanings 
given to the categories of IP and development, and how they endeavour to submit such 
existing meanings towards their current agenda, will determine to a large extent 
whether the challenge in question is likely to transform the current state of affairs or 
rather strengthen it. The latter scenario is more likely if challenging actors are unable to 
submit the (existing) ‘sign’ to serve their goals, contributing to both the reproduction 
and legitimisation of existing meanings, arrangements and power relation within the 
regime. 
 
Faced with the difficulty of bringing about radical breaks with existing practices, 
Bakhtin insisted that an alternative discourse could not bring about radical change on 
its own. It was only in times of crises that the inherently dialectical quality of ‘the sign’ 
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was fully in the open.40 In our case, radical changes would happen through an 
alignment of oppositional discourses with ‘objective crises’ which often opened up the 
possibility of questioning and suspending the initial adherence to the assumptions and 
categories of the established order/doxa.41 Resistance movements could bring about 
transformative changes only when they made these doxic classifications the object of 
the struggle itself. Most of the time – and this was one of the radical arguments of the 
Bakhtin circle – we fail to recognise that we possess and regularly rely on established 
discourses that are not ‘our own’ and which reflect the underlying asymmetrical power 
relations between us and other interlocutors. By repeatedly appropriating, borrowing 
and using them, utterances and discourses, even oppositional ones, can help maintain 
and reproduce such power-relations. Change is possible; indeed, it is what routinely 
occurs, but, more often than not, leading to the adaptation and renewal of the 
established ideology/order rather than its overturn.  
 
A dialogic approach to regime conflict is favoured over textualism not only because of 
its coherent and social epistemology of both agency and the structure in which it is 
embedded, but also because of the way it draws attention to how language as praxis is 
implicated and put to work in political acts of resistance. Language, we have seen, is 
the site of ideological phenomena par excellence, providing the main tool through which 
domination and resistance are possible. Bakhtin recognised the difficulty of 
appropriating ‘the sign’ in dialogic relations; this difficulty is bound to be higher the 
more entrenched the established discourse is. In these cases, as challengers appropriate 
doxic elements of the dominant discourse, their alternative discourse is more likely to 
become captive and in effect reproduce the ‘veracity’ of that which is appropriated. 
The more an alternative discourse is built upon doxic utterances/understandings, the 
easier the process of absorption by the dominant discourse is bound to be. This is what 
happened to the Development Agenda.  
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2. Conflicts in the IP regime and the 2004 Development Agenda 
 
Ever since the first patent monopoly was issued in Venice in 1474, all the constitutive 
elements of the current intellectual property (IP) regime – e.g. knowledge as 
appropriable (through IP claims), IP as a (natural) right, territoriality of IP claims, IP 
rights as necessary to spur innovation, and so on – have been contested at one point or 
another. During this long period, of the many different ways of thinking about 
‘governing’ knowledge production, circulation and distribution that incessantly 
brought various actors in conflict with each other, a particular way emerged as 
‘objective’ and ‘rational’ – that of granting control over knowledge to a specific and 
narrow group to the exclusion of others through the granting of IP privileges (later, 
rights). It was through IP laws – law being the quintessential form of the power to 
produce social groups and other categories – that knowledge which had hitherto 
boasted the properties of a public good gradually became scarce and commodified. 
 
It is the imperative formulated by IP-holders as a group – which, incidentally, does not 
necessarily overlap with that of inventors and creators themselves – that has remained 
at the core of IP law, even if its concrete manifestations have varied through 
time/place reflecting the compromises and outcomes of political struggles involving 
other groups. By virtue of its legal formulation and being guaranteed by the state – the 
only actor with legitimate monopoly over (symbolic) violence42 – such imperative has 
gained an almost natural and universal status. But it is precisely because (IP) law is a 
complex machinery of control with powerful naturalising and universalising effects 
that it is simultaneously the object and outcome of political struggles between various 
groups that seek to use it towards their preferred ends. Accordingly, the IP regime has 
remained contested, indeed, it has become even more so, the more the 
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commodification of knowledge through IPRs has hastened its pace, bringing even 
more groups and issues into its orbit.  Importantly, the international IP regime – 
ushered in by the 1883 Paris Convention on patents, the 1886 Berne Convention on 
copyright and the creation of an international secretariat43 to oversee them – was born 
amidst political struggles over IP amongst key state and non-state actors in the latter 
part of the 19th century. Likewise, the emergence of the global IP regime – set in motion 
by the 1995 WTO TRIPS Agreement44– was preceded and succeeded by even fiercer 
contestations between state and non-state actors, this time involving representatives 
from the ‘developing’ world, a category that had fully come into existence.   
 
It would not be too excessive to argue that, despite numerous variations in time/place, 
IP-holders as a group have managed to successfully absorb most political challenges 
within the IP regime and manoeuvre it in directions largely in accordance with their 
interests. TRIPS itself is a striking example, for it was IP-reliant business actors – high-
tech and entertainment industries in the US, Europe and Japan – and their 
governments, who, appealing to ‘universal’ ideals such as development, economic 
growth, free trade and so on, managed to secure through this binding international 
public law the kind of IP protection and enforcement standards aimed primarily at 
locking in their competitive advantage.45 Political conflicts within the IP regime have 
multiplied post-TRIPS as other regime actors have mobilised to change what they 
deem a disadvantageous or inappropriate way of governing IPRs.46 But these contests 
have tended to be issue-specific, with challengers, many of whom went on to become 
Agenda proponents, mobilizing in an attempt to change the IP regime norms/rules 
that impact on other issues, most notably, access to medicines and the protection of 
biodiversity. The 2004 call for a Development Agenda was rather more comprehensive, 
not only because it sought to make development the core concern of WIPO and the IP 
regime, but also because it nominally declared the intention to critically examine and 
challenge the ‘absolute truths’ that underlie recent IP trends at WIPO and beyond.47 
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Nonetheless, the staging of this struggle presented not the confrontation of radically 
different worldviews each aiming to achieve its own validation, but yet another 
challenge on the margin. Despite their intention to challenge doxic ‘truths’, the 
constitutive demands of the Agenda were largely based on key elements of the 
established ideology. The main grievance of the Agenda proponents, led initially by 
Brazilian and Argentinian representatives, was that IPRs have been expanding on 
behalf of private IP-owners without regard for public and developmental concerns, 
thus hindering the achievement of progress and welfare for all.48 This, it was noted, 
was to be achieved not only by ‘bringing development’ to WIPO, but by bringing 
balance to the entire IP regime that had hitherto been disproportionally concerned with 
protecting the rights of private IP-holders. But the same call that promised radical 
challenges to doxic regime ‘truths’ simultaneously relied upon and further legitimised 
them. The Proposal made clear that it was primarily concerned with balancing the 
existing arrangement and not with questioning or radically changing it. Not only the 
Proposal, but subsequent group submissions, too, were saturated with concerns for 
balance, e.g. balancing the interests of IP-users with those of IP-owners, the societal 
interests with the costs of IP protection, and so on. Moreover, despite repeated 
demands that IP rules should be designed that help meet the “daunting challenge” of 
development,49 the 2004 Proposal did not explicitly clarify, let alone challenge, the 
meaning and premises of ‘development’.  
 
After three years of contestation, the 45 recommendations that were eventually 
adopted in 2007 at the WIPO General Assembly held no great promise for 
transformative changes. The recommendations certainly retained the language of 
balance and of the importance of IP for development, but they merely encouraged 
WIPO to promote, discuss, explore, consider, conduct studies and exchange 
experiences.50 Importantly, some of the bolder demands made by developing countries 
– amending the WIPO Convention, negotiating a multilateral agreement for open 
access to publicly-funded knowledge and, perhaps most importantly of all, creating 
alternative systems of creativity/innovation not based on IP51 – had been completely 
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sidelined by then. To be sure, it is almost impossible to identify a WIPO committee that 
does not have some sort of development-related issue in its schedule today. 
Nonetheless, at the time of writing WIPO has yet to move beyond studies and the 
global IP regime can hardly be said to have become more development-friendly or, 
indeed, balanced.  
 
 
Three doxic ‘shared understandings’ in the Development Agenda 
 
Utterances – in our case, the assertions, statements and demands that interlocutors 
produce about the nature of the problem and solutions to it – are neither originary, nor 
original. All of the IP regime’s existence, all the past struggles it embodies, all the past 
and present utterances/meanings ascribed to IP and development, not only precede 
what proponents and opponents of the Agenda communicate to each other, but also 
provide the material for such communication. As noted earlier, these utterances 
inevitably reflect and refract, to varying degrees, both present and past hierarchical 
divisions, relations and classifications within the regime. What representatives of the 
Group of Friends of Development communicate to each other and their opponents at 
WIPO cannot wholly escape the established perspective on IP and development, but 
how their collective grievances and demands are constructed has consequences on 
whether their challenge helps bring about change at WIPO and beyond, or whether it 
largely reproduces the established way of governing IPRs. As noted earlier, the more 
doxic categories and assumptions underpin the discourse of the challenging actors and 
remain unchallenged in their spoken and written utterances, the smaller the likelihood 
of transformative changes in dominant practices. True to the dialogism’s commitment 
to contextual analysis, the historical, material and ideological nature of the ‘shared 
understandings’/’truths’ on which the demands of the Agenda were built are 
discussed in turn. 
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A. ‘Development’ 
 
When regime challengers draw upon available discursive fields to construct collective 
diagnoses of grievances and solutions, the alternative discourse they create reflects, 
among other things, the categories according to which they envisage themselves, the 
‘address’ they occupy in a regime. It is from this position that they act and respond; the 
Agenda makes this category/position quite explicit, both in its name (an agenda for 
development) and in terms of the group that authored it (the Group of Friends of 
Development). However, this category – and the properties assigned to it – are political 
rather than neutral. Indeed, the ability to impose one’s own categories as legitimate 
and natural lies at the core of political power, the power to impose divisions, “to make 
groups, to manipulate the structure of society”.52  The category of ‘developing 
countries’ was not historically produced by the group of peoples who are now 
subsumed into it, although it seems to have been appropriated and accepted by them, 
or rather by the actors who speak on their behalf at WIPO and elsewhere. There has not 
been any serious attempt to challenge this categorisation in international fora, even as 
the development discourse and practice based on it has had incalculable effects on the 
material reality of the people living in the ‘developing’ world. On the contrary, this 
categorisation has often underpinned political action requesting, for instance, special 
and differential treatment for this group of countries, thus validating its existence, 
insofar as a group exists only where there are agents who can speak publically, 
legitimately and officially in its name.53 However, by virtue of reproducing this 
dominant classification in collective acts of resistance, the perceptions and properties 
imposed on the ‘developing countries’ category are often reinforced, as well as the 
authority of those who produced it.  
 
Despite its universalistic claims, it has been shown that development is a worldview 
with a specific historical and political genealogy.54 In this well-known critique, the 
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division into the ‘inferior’, ‘undeveloped’ world, with its attendant properties – 
‘backward’, ‘primitive’, ‘traditional’– and the ‘superior’, ‘advanced’ and ‘civilised’ 
West, is one of the founding and monologic acts of the West. As part of a broader 
modernity discourse, development was what happened – indeed, ought to happen – to 
other peoples in the process of acquiring the properties and standards of the Western 
civilisation. In time, this development discourse came to be seen as natural and even 
progressive, permeating international institutions and laws, as well as the practices of 
the powerful states that created and sustained them. At the heart of this discourse was 
and remains a view of development as a unilinear, catch-up process in which 
‘developing’ countries strive to achieve the standards of the ‘developed’ world. 
 
When representatives of ‘developing’ countries engage in collective acts of resistance 
drawing upon the doxic category of development, they strengthen and legitimise this 
dominant classification, as well as properties imposed on them as ‘inferior’. Inevitably, 
this has important consequences on the success of their political challenges. Indeed, the 
most important and ultimately unsuccessful effort by some developing countries to 
reconfigure the world order in which they found themselves – the New International 
Economic Order movement of the 1970s – like the dependency theory from which it 
partly drew its inspiration, only challenged dependency development, not 
‘development’ or their categorisation as ‘developing countries’ per se. These doxic 
classifications and their attendant properties, ultimately symbolising the power of one 
group to dominate and transform others according to its worldview, have remained 
unchallenged and continue to permeate the alternative discourses of developing 
countries’ representatives, even as they are becoming increasingly more resistant in 
various regimes.  
 
The monological reproduction of this hierarchical division is fully present and goes 
unchallenged in the Agenda, strengthening the authority of the dominant actors (key 
developed countries) to prescribe how best to govern IP for developmental purposes. 
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The core demand of the Agenda is for a more balanced IP regime that helps meet the 
“daunting challenge of development”.55 Despite the centrality of development to both 
the Agenda and to the collective identity of those promoting it, neither the original 
Proposal, nor an additional and lengthier document submitted on behalf of the Friends 
Group during the first intergovernmental meeting in April 200556 questioned its 
meaning and substance. To the extent that development is discussed at all, it is in the 
context of it being an enormous challenge. Tellingly, the 2005 submission of the Group, 
and many other submissions that were to follow, betrayed the extent to which doxic 
development as a unilinear, catch-up process had been appropriated and internalised 
by its members, as they repeatedly sought to legitimise their demands on account of 
the challenges developing countries faced “in the path towards development”.57 Not 
only them, but their opponents, too, referred continuously to the same deterministic 
vision of development as a “journey from [a] developing to developed” status,58 while 
simultaneously reiterating the important role ‘proper’ IP protection played in this 
‘journey’.   
 
The appropriation of doxic assumptions according to which the developed world holds 
the key to the only real and credible route to development is also to be found in 
Agenda demands about closing the “knowledge gap” and “the digital divide” that 
separates the developing and developed world.59 The language of a 
technological/knowledge gap fits well within the established development discourse 
as a catch-up process that is technologically deterministic, i.e. underpinned by 
assumptions that development challenges can and should be met through access to 
knowledge and technology (that developed countries possess). One of the main pitfalls 
of such excessive reliance on technology as a solution to development – present both in 
the established discourse and in the proposals submitted by representatives of 
developing countries – rests not only in its unproblematic acceptance of doxic 
development, but also in a conceptualisation of technology that is wholly detached 
from the political, social, economic, cultural context in which it is developed, used and 
transformed. This reductionist view informed a number of Agenda supporters’ 
  
24 
 
demands for a real transfer of technology through, for instance, a WIPO Body 
dedicated to such transfer.60 Even so, neither this nor a new proposal for an Access to 
Knowledge Treaty, made it to the 2007 recommendations.  
 
 
B. ‘IP as necessary for Development’ 
 
In not recognising and challenging the developed/developing division – indeed, being 
built upon it – the Agenda also reproduces the particular way in which IP has 
historically been implicated in the established development discourse and practice. 
Indeed, the established view that ‘proper’ IP protection is necessary for development 
cannot be separated from the established development discourse and practice. The IP-
development category has a long history, which, true to Bakhtin’s claim that ‘nothing is 
absolutely dead’, manifests itself in recent communication between Agenda 
proponents and opponents at WIPO in various ways. IP laws were introduced to most 
of what is referred today as developing countries during colonisation, a political 
project that was justified on the same binary division of the world that still informs the 
established development discourse today. Formal colonial rule was consolidated 
steadily during the 19th century, precisely the period during which an international IP 
regime of sorts was emerging among the developed countries of the time, formalised 
by the Berne and Paris Conventions in the 1880s. It was mainly during this period that 
IP laws, such as they existed, were extended to the colonies but, importantly, this 
extension had nothing to do with the societies in these parts and everything to do with 
securing the colonisers’ economic interest against each other in the colonial territories.61 
In short, being part and parcel of empire building strategies, the IP laws that found 
their way into colonial territories were monologic and completely alien to the socio-
economic realities over which they exerted their power. Despite this violent 
introduction, IP laws were not annulled after decolonisation. On the contrary, the 
internalisation of these IP laws in the new independent states was a central, rather than 
  
25 
 
an incidental, part of their transformation into sovereign states. Being mediated by the 
same international institutions and treaties that had facilitated their colonisation earlier 
on, such transformation saw most new independent states adhering to inherited IP 
statutes as a ‘privilege’ and ‘duty’ of statehood.  
 
Although some developing countries (e.g. Kenya, Brazil, Mexico and India) did make 
some changes to their IP laws during the 1970s, no radical changes to the structure of 
the inherited IP statutes took place. To some extent, this is attributable to the 
internalisation of the dominant development discourse at the time, and to the 
international organisations that espoused it, that continued to define development as 
the process of socio-economic realities being transformed in the image of the West, 
predicated, among other things, on investment flows and technology transfer. This 
discourse continued to justify the enactment of Western IP laws as a necessary 
prerequisite for attracting technology transfer, investment and, more generally, for 
effecting the transition from ‘primitive’ to ‘developed’ and ‘civilised’.62 Amidst voices 
reinforcing the view – often without any evidence – that a ‘proper’ IP system was 
central to development, very few doubts were raised about the adequacy of such a 
system for the particular realities of developing countries. More importantly, 
developing countries’ representatives themselves appeared to have largely internalised 
the view that IPRs were important to economic growth, technology transfer and 
domestic creativity. Indeed, it remains the case that this doxic assumption continues to 
underpin developing countries’ participation in the IP regime today. 
 
It will be said that developing countries did challenge the international IP regime after 
decolonisation. It is true that some developing countries’ representatives, led by 
Brazilian and Indian diplomats, were involved in an earlier kind of ‘development 
agenda’ during the 1960s and 1970s.63 Although they appeared threatening to key 
dominant actors, developing countries’ proposals to reform the copyright and patent 
rules so as to facilitate their development strategies were in fact a clear reflection of 
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how deeply and comprehensively doxic views about IP and development had been 
internalised by their representatives. The Brazilian delegation’s proposal to the UN 
General Assembly in 1961 appeared sufficiently aware of the “biased ... narrow, and 
sclerotic views” held by dominant actors resisting calls to reform the patent system in 
order to respond to “the needs and requirements of under-developed countries”.64 
However, as in the Agenda, nowhere was development as a category challenged, nor 
the positive role IP protection was assumed to play in it. Likewise, the aim was above 
all to balance “the legitimate claims of patentees” with the needs of developing 
countries, as well as to “cure [the patent system] of its imperfections”.65 Being framed 
as a matter of balance, it further secured the legitimacy of the existing international IP 
regime and the role IPRs could play in meeting the needs of developing countries. Built 
largely on the doxic categories of IP and development, these earlier demands allowed 
key dominant actors to absorb the challenge, by arguing that the changes proposed to 
the international IP regime did not constitute an appropriate way of assisting developing 
countries to meet their developmental needs.66 
 
Ultimately, these earlier efforts to reform international IP rules failed. Not only were 
they unsuccessful, but, importantly, they were superseded by the negotiation (1986-
1994) of the TRIPS Agreement which incorporated a stricter and ultra-binding version 
of the very IP rules developing countries had sought to reform (and much more). 
During the TRIPS negotiations representatives of the US, the EU, Switzerland and IP-
reliant business actors continued to reassure developing countries’ representatives that 
‘better’ IP protection and enforcement was a boon to development, stimulating more 
R&D, investment flows, transfers of technology and economic growth.67 It was difficult 
to successfully counter these arguments, given that the attempts of developing 
countries’ representatives to reform the IP system during the 1960s and 1970s had not 
challenged the assumed (positive) relation between IP protection and these other 
categories. 
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Nor are such relationships challenged in the Agenda; indeed, it is almost impossible to 
find a submission made at WIPO by developed countries’ representatives – 
individually or as part of Friends Group – that fails to mention the important role IPRs 
play in innovation, growth and development. This marks another space where 
seemingly opposed actors in fact use the same language and share the same doxic 
categories and assumptions. The US response in 2005, for instance, confirmed the 
apparently obvious but as yet unproven positive role IPRs play in development, 
highlighting in particular their role in promoting innovation/creativity and transfer of 
technology,68 just as the original Proposal had done a year earlier.69  This response, 
representative of most Agenda opponents’ arguments, was entirely non-polemical in 
nature. This is unsurprising not only because of the ‘shared understandings’ that 
underpin both opponents and proponents’ discourses, but also because apolitical 
language is an effective tool of negating political struggle as such.70 Indeed, the 
underlying argument of opponents was that if developing countries had not seen the 
full benefits of IP protection on development yet, this constituted a technical rather than 
a political issue. This position obscured the political and ideological nature of the IP 
regime and it effectively removed the possibility of questioning the validity and ability 
of the current IP arrangement to serve the different economic and social realities 
prevailing in developing countries. In part, this was also possible because the 
representatives of these latter countries had not questioned the IP regime on these 
terms, being primarily concerned with the issue of balancing it. Moreover, developing 
countries’ demands for balance remained rather declaratory and, whenever they were 
elaborated upon, the achievement of balance often appeared to depend on returning to 
TRIPS standards.71 This move effectively construes this problematic agreement as a 
balanced one and contributes to obscuring the political struggles that led to and 
followed it, including the Development Agenda itself.   
 
Another proposal for achieving balance – indicative simultaneously of the 
appropriation and absence of any challenge to the doxic view of development and the 
assumed role the IP regime plays in it – is to be found in Agenda proponents’ 
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arguments about the “knowledge gap” and “the digital divide” that separates the 
developing and developed world.72 The existence of this gap underpins some of the 
most important demands for changes to WIPO and the IP regime, especially those 
related to improved access to knowledge and real transfer of technology to developing 
countries.73 The demand that WIPO and the IP regime contribute to the closure of this 
‘gap’ in effect reinforces the doxic categorisation of Western knowledge as ‘valid’ and 
that produced elsewhere as ‘useless’ for developmental purposes, while it 
simultaneously reinforces the role that the IP regime is assumed to play in propelling 
developing countries towards development. But neither the IP regime of the 19th 
century, nor its 20th century version were established to aid developing countries in 
their ‘path to development’. Whereas early IP laws became part of colonial territories 
in order to secure the colonisers’ economic interest against each other, the current 
global IP regime was set in place through TRIPS largely with the aim of safeguarding 
the competitive advantage of key developed countries in key knowledge industries 
through maintaining – not narrowing – the technological/knowledge gap.74  
 
Yet another way in which established norms and practices are reproduced in the 
Agenda demand for balance rests in repeated requests by Agenda proponents that 
WIPO provide balanced and tailored IP technical assistance.75 Such seemingly 
reasonable request is not only inconsistent with historical evidence, but also with 
substantial demands made by the same group of actors in the context of the Agenda, 
especially those related to ‘policy space’.76 Various submissions and speeches repeated 
demands that the policy space of developing countries’ governments in IP matters 
should be safeguarded while, simultaneously, that WIPO should adjust its activities to 
help them design IP strategies for developmental purposes.  However, the latter 
demands envisaged an expanded role for WIPO, including coordinating technical 
assistance, sharing information, managing transfer of technology, negotiating new IP 
treaties, conducting IP studies and so on. Such demands, in turn, opened up the way 
for the Agenda to shrink by 2007 to a series of recommendations that instructed WIPO 
to promote, discuss, consider, conduct studies, exchange experiences, and so on.77 
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Unsurprisingly, the plan of implementation that started in 2008 appeared largely as a 
license for WIPO to penetrate even more deeply into the socio-political realities of 
developing countries. 
 
 
C. ‘IP as incentive’ 
 
In addition to appropriating and posing no serious challenge to the doxic vision of 
development and of the presumed positive role IPRs play in it, neither the earlier 
collective challenge to reform the international IP regime during the 1960s-1970s, nor 
the current Agenda recognises or challenges another doxic assumption: that of IP 
protection as the necessary economic incentive for innovation/creativity. This is 
perhaps one of the most entrenched elements of the IP regime doxa. Today, it is widely 
believed that there would be no creativity and innovation but for IP protection, despite 
the fact that historically creative periods have often preceded rather than followed the 
appropriation knowledge through intellectual property.78 Like established discourses 
of development and modernity, the ‘IP as incentive to the individual creator’ 
justification is also a Western creation.79 This key disposition in time concealed not only 
the inherently collective reality of human creativity in the West and elsewhere,80 but 
also the arbitrary classification of Western knowledge as ‘advanced’, ‘modern’, ‘logico-
empirical’ and hence worthy of IP protection, to the exclusion of other knowledges that 
were seen as ‘traditional’, ‘primitive’, and ‘mythopoeic’.81 Appropriating this doxic 
assumption in alternative discourses such as that of the Agenda has the effect of not 
only legitimising it further, but also of marginalising different forms of knowledge 
creation and distribution.  
 
One profoundly political way of objectifying and naturalising not only the established 
view of ‘IP as incentive’, but also that of ‘IP protection as necessary for development’, 
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is through presenting these doxic assumptions as neutral and scientific ‘truths’. But 
despite sophisticated analytical tools at our disposal, we have a very limited 
understanding of even the most basic questions, such as, for instance, what the grant of 
IPRs accomplishes.82 Despite claims of scientificity, innovation and creativity still 
remain the terra incognita of science.83 Our understanding is even more limited for the 
more complicated relation between IPRs and development.84 This said, Agenda 
proponents appeared convinced not only of the generally positive link between IP and 
development, but also that objective and scientific studies are possible and necessary in 
order to balance the current IP regime, through, for instance, judging new and existing 
IPRs on the basis of studies over their ‘cost and benefits’ on the ground.85 These 
demands enhance the possibility of the Agenda being absorbed by dominant actors, 
not least because scientific knowledge is not impartial and dominant actors have a 
superior record of using it to objectify and neutralise threatened ‘truths’.  
 
The doxic view of IP protection as the proper economic incentive for individuals who 
would otherwise not invent/create, although likely to be as incorrect in the West as 
elsewhere, remains unchallenged and is accepted as ‘truth’ in the current Agenda, 
despite its commitment to challenge such ‘truths’.  Indeed, it has been impossible to 
identify any statement made in the context of the Agenda where it has been 
challenged. Despite some initial calls to consider alternative systems of 
creativity/innovation not based on IP,86 Agenda proponents failed to propose such 
alternatives, or an alternative ‘common sense’ that incorporated within it heretical 
experiences of concretely tailoring IPRs – or any other incentive system – to the specific 
needs and realities of developing countries. The failure to put forth a concrete 
alternative is largely related to the internalisation and reproduction of the established 
IP and development discourse over time, for no developing country government has 
seriously experimented with other incentive systems outside of the dominant IP 
regime post-independence, even as alternative systems of knowledge production and 
dissemination have existed in them for a long time. This was the case when the 
international IP regime permitted national variations, and certainly once the much 
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more prohibitive TRIPS and the increasingly restrictive global IP regime was set in 
motion. 
 
All this is not presented as evidence that radical change is no longer possible, but 
rather to draw attention to how the process of dis/re-articulation of discourses by 
actors engaged in regime contest can contribute to the renewal and invigoration of 
established ideas and practices.  This was the case with the earlier ‘IP and development 
agenda’ of the 1960s and 1970s. It does not follow the current Agenda is 
indistinguishable from this earlier challenge, but merely that as long as new challenges 
continue to be organised according to doxic assumptions/classifications, the dominant 
discourse is likely to continue to successfully absorb them and emerge reinvigorated.  
Indeed, the 45 recommendations that were adopted in 2007 included none of the 
earlier, bolder demands of the developing countries’ representatives, and appeared to 
hold no great promise for radical changes at WIPO. An IP Development Database 
coordinating technical assistance along the lines proposed by the US in 2005 was 
already up and running in 2009, while some developing countries’ representatives 
complained that the most important element of the mandate – that of discussing the 
relation between IP and development – was being neglected.87 
 
 
3. No last words 
 
 
That the Agenda started off as an ambitious political challenge – seeking to transform 
WIPO and the IP regime into tools for development – but was attenuated by 2007 to a 
number of recommendations that pose no serious threat to the IP-development 
established discourse, has not been presented to support the argument that the IP 
regime cannot be transformed. Regimes are contested and ideological processes whose 
outcomes are not determined a priori.  Rather, the argument has been that 
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transformative changes to regime norms and practices are harder to bring about 
because challengers often rely on ‘genres’ that are not their own, but borrowed and 
appropriated from the dominant discourse. As they do so in an effort to mobilise, 
construct collective grievances and seek solutions, their alternative discourse is likely 
to become captive and in effect reproduce and strengthen (doxic elements of) the 
dominant discourse. Understanding the limiting effects of adherence to doxa is 
obviously useful, but finding ways of transcending these limitations is a much more 
challenging task for observers and agents alike. To a large extent, this is due to the fact 
that neither group is situated (completely) outside the dominant discourse. But it is 
only when challenging doxic categories and assumptions becomes the aim of political 
mobilisation that radical changes may occur. The key task of the Agenda ought to have 
been that of questioning ‘development’ itself and the positive role IPRs are assumed to 
play in it. As some have suggested, ‘development’ ought to be whatever a community 
should want to have happen to it; the basic criterion for this kind of development is 
whether or not a community/society is a “being for itself”.88 A critical view of 
development on these lines could have enabled political challengers to appropriate 
other elements of the doxa (though not strictly of the IP regime doxa), for instance that 
of self-determination. This alternative is also limited, but it may have been more 
conducive to allowing heretical practices and experiments with incentive systems and 
development to flourish.  
 
The important ideological and material consequences of contests over the 
Development Agenda, or other IP contests for that matter, warrant a more detailed and 
substantial analysis than is afforded them here. Their impact on our way of learning, 
creating, innovating and living is too significant to be undeserving of more serious 
attention. It is precisely because of such significance – and not on account of excessive 
dialogic properties on its part  – that the case of the Development Agenda was used to 
illustrate how a dialogic framework to regime conflicts can be used empirically. If the 
dialogic framework proposed here can help us understand the contested and 
ideological nature of a regime that, unlike most others, is often seen as a ‘technical’ 
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rather than a political one, perhaps it can be used even more fruitfully elsewhere. In the 
process, both the framework and its application would be further improved. 
 
                                                     
I would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their instructive and helpful comments 
on an earlier version of this paper. All shortcomings are mine alone.  
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